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Molinari and Seligson: Bellis v. United States

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BELLIS v. UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-Fifth amendment-derogationof fifth

amendment as it pertains to documents of organized entities. 417
U.S. 85 (1974).
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that a three-person
partnership does not have a fifth amendment privilege with respect to its business records.' It would appear from the Court's
reasoning that regardless of how small the partnership, individual
partners can no longer refuse to produce partnership records
which tend to incriminate them, thus leaving the single proprietorship as the only remaining protected business entity. This article will focus on the historical roots of the fifth amendment privilege as it relates to the documents of organized entities and will
analyze the reasons for the steady erosion of the privilege which
culiminated in the decision in Bellis v. United States, a decision
neither logically necessitated by, nor consistent with prior decisions of the Court.
As will be pointed out, a test to determine when the privilege
should apply had developed through the case law. This test focused on the degree of personal involvement between the individuals and the organization, rather than on the type of organization
involved. Although the test has recently been confounded by the
mechanical standard applied in Bellis, it is, in the opinion of the
authors, still a viable means of determining the circumstances
under which the basic constitutional protection of the fifth
amendment will be either granted or denied.
I.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE PRIVILEGE AS APPLIED TO
ORGANIZED ENTITIES

The common law courts drew no distinction between compelled oral testimony and the forced production of written documents. The fact that the documents being sought were kept in
conjunction with a corporate entity was also of no consequence.

The case of Rex v. Cornelius,2 in which it was alleged that certain
justices of the peace had been unlawfully taking money for the
1. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
2. 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1744).
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granting of licenses to a group of incorporated alehouse owners,
was typical. The prosecutor investigating the culpability of the
owners wanted to inspect the books of the corporation. The judge
refused the prosecutor's request on the ground that the effect of
such a ruling would be to require a witness to give evidence
against himself. Not only did the court not draw any distinction
between compelled oral and written testimony, but it assumed
that the privilege protected the owners from being forced to produce records, even of a corporate nature, if they were personally
incriminating.
The only qualification on the privilege was that the document be of a private, not a public nature. The very fact that they
were incriminating, however, apparently led the court to view
them as private. In Regina v. Mead,' the prosecution requested
the production of books which contained the corporation's election results, receipts and disbursements. The court held that the
books were of a purely private nature and that to compel the
production of these documents would be the equivalent of making
a man produce evidence against himself in a criminal prosecution.
Rex v. Purnell4 is one of the first cases in which the argument
of the state's visitorial power over a corporation5 was advanced in
an attempt to justify the compelled production of corporate documents. A prosecutor wanted to inspect the books of Oxford University, believing that they would furnish evidence against its
Vice-Chancellor. The government contended that because the
King was a "visitor" 6 of the University he had an absolute right
to inspect the books, regardless of their incriminating nature. The
defense reasoned that if the court were to allow inspection of the
books, it would no longer be a court of justice but an aid to the
inquisition of the state.7 The court rejected the argument that it
should suspend its traditional standards8 for the required production of books.
3. 92 Eng. Rep. 119 (1703).
4. 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (1749).

5. This argument is often made in the United States. See Grant v. United States,
227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).

6. As defined by BLAcK's LAW DicnoNARY 1744 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), "visitor" means
"an inspector of the government of corporations, or bodies politic." [citation omitted].
7. 96 Eng. Rep. 20, 22 (1748).

8.The four necessary requisites (as conceded by the Solicitor General for the Crown)
for inspections of this nature were: first, that the books had to be public; second, that the
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Thus the common law privilege against self-incrimination
was almost absolute..The controlling factor in all these English
cases was not the nature of the documents sought, nor the seriousness of the crime being investigated, but whether the documents
were incriminatory to the person in possession, Even documents
of a purely public nature, although not protected per se, were
protected under the rule of Rex v. Purnell. There was no discussion as to the type of entity claiming the privilege, or of the
capacity in which the documents were held. Consideration of
these factors is a purely American innovation.
II. UNITED STATES v. BoYD

The landmark American case concerning the privilege of selfincrimination as it relates to records and documents is United
States v. Boyd. 0 Boyd and Sons, a family partnership, was
charged with depriving the government of its lawful duties on
imports of foreign glass through the use of false invoices. The
invoices were essential to the government's case. The prosecution
relied on the fifth section of the revenue law" which required the
defendant to produce in court his business books, invoices and
papers. The penalty for refusal was that the charges were considered confessed. While holding this statute unconstitutional, the
Court noted that it was similar to a section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, passed by the first Congress, which had withstood constitutional scrutiny.' 2 The Judiciary Act, however, limited the right
to compel documents by referring to the ordinary rules of Chancery, which severely restricted the cases in which the production
of documents could be required. The cardinal rule of the Court
of Chancery was that it would not decree a discovery which might
tend to convict the party of a crime or lead to forfeiture of his
property.'" The Court held that the omission of this broad exception in the statute challenged in Boyd rendered the statute repugnant to the Constitution because the forced production of incriminating private books and papers was equivalent to compelling
party applying had to have an interest in them; third, that they had to be material to the
suit then in the court; fourth, that the person in possession could not be forced to produce
anything which would be incriminating to him. 96 Eng. Rep. 20, 23 (1748).
9. See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
10. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
11. Act to amend the customs revenue laws, and to repeal moieties, Act of June 22,
1874, § 5, 18 Stat. 186.
12. 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886).
13. Id. at 631-32.
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one to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the fifth
amendment.
The Boyd decision was the first American case to extend the
fifth amend ment privilege to forced production of private papers
and documents. As at common-law, the type of business entity
with which the papers were connected did not enter into the
Court's determination. It was implicit throughout the decision
that the invoices of this family partnership were indeed the private papers of the defendants who held them in a personal capacity.14 The fact that the documents sought were partnership records was not mentioned in the decision, nor was it suggested that
there was any distinction between personal documents and those
kept in conjunction with an organized entity. The Boyd Court's
reliance on common-law doctrine was also reflected by its acceptance of business records such as invoices as personal when the
possessor of such records would be incriminated by their produc5
tion.

The holding in Boyd was specifically limited to the production of what the Court termed "private papers."' 6 Boyd should
not be interpreted as ruling that records of any type of organization, no matter how large or small, are privileged as private papers." Boyd may be interpreted, however, as holding that records
of a business are private and therefore protected when there exists
a close personal identification between the individual and his
organization. The Boyd analysis is a viable way of determining
when an organization's "officers" should be granted or denied the
privilege. The determination that the records at issue were private did not depend on the label put on the particular business
entity involved. Rather, it seemed to focus, in a common-sense
manner, on the nature of the relationship between the defendant
and the organization, a family-owned-and-operated business.
This is in marked contrast with subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIONS

A. Corporations
Hale v. Henkel'" was the first case to establish that certain
14. This observation was made by the district court in United States v. Onassis, 126
F. Supp. 190, 208 (D.D.C. 1954).
15. 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
16. Id. at 631-32.
17. See United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 208 (D.D.C. 1954).
18. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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types of organizations could not claim the fifth amendment privilege. A subpoena was issued commanding Hale, the secretary and
treasurer of the corporation, to answer certain questions or to
produce the papers and documents desired by the grand jury.
Hale refused, citing as one of his reasons that the documents
might tend to incriminate him. The Court held that Hale could
not avail himself of the privilege because there was an immunity
statute protecting him from future prosecution.
Hale then tried to invoke the privilege on the corporation's
behalf, claiming that compelling him to produce the documents
would incriminate the corporation. The Court ruled, however,
that an officer of a corporation cannot claim a privilege against
the production of the records on behalf of the corporation, just as
a third person cannot claim a fifth amendment privilege on behalf
of another.'" Further, the Court gave several reasons why the
corporation could not claim the privilege on its own behalf: first,
because it received special franchises and privileges from the
state; second, because it did business interstate and thereby invited visitation by both the state and the federal government;
third, because a corporation is a creature of the state and is presumed to be incorporated for the public good.20
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brewer, citing Chief Justice
Marshall's statement that "the great object of incorporation is to
bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men, ' 21 contended that a corporation
was merely an aggregate of individuals who decided to use the
corporate form as a tool by which to achieve their ends.22 It followed, therefore, that the corporation should be permitted to assert the fifth amendment privilege in its own right. If the corporation is treated as an individual for the purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, he argued, then it
should be treated similarly for the purpose of the fifth amendment.2 The dissent also challenged the government's right to
infringe upon a constitutionally protected right simply because
an organization does business in an area regulated by the government, and it further rejected the argument that the government
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 74-75.
Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 562 (1830).
201 U.S. 43, 85 (1906) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 84-85.
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obtains the right of2 visitation
merely because of the interstate
4

nature of a business.

Hale v. Henkel did not rule that an officer of a corporation
could not avail himself of the privilege against self-incrimination
when the documents in question tended to be personally incriminating. It was only because there was an immunity statute exempting Hale from further prosecution that he was forced to turn
over the documents. In deciding whether a corporate officer could
claim immunity under the fifth amendment on the ground that
the corporate books he was asked to produce tended to be personally incriminating, a district court one year later ruled in Ex parte
Chapman25 that if the records disclosed a criminal offense and
revealed a petitioner's complicity in it, he was entitled to refuse
to produce such records before the grand jury. Prior cases which
had denied the privilege when a corporation was involved, were
distinguished on the basis of the fact that Chapman was claiming
a personal privilege, and was not merely exerting a privilege on
behalf of the corporation. He would be personally incriminated
if the books of the corporation were produced. In Ex parte
Chapman the significant factor was, as it seems to have been in
Boyd, the ease with which one could identify Chapman with the
corporation. As the general manager since its inception, he conducted all the business of the corporation. All the corporation's
books, records, and papers were in his hands and had been kept
under his direction. Thus, on the basis of the intimacy of the
relationship and the personal identification of Chapman with the
corporate activity, the court was not compelled to distinguish
between his private records and the records of the corporation.
The question of whether an officer of one of the increasing number
of large and impersonal corporations 2 could claim such a privilege as well had yet to be decided by a court.
24. Id. at 86.
25. 153 F. 371 (C.C.D. Idaho 1907).
26. The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by individuals
or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the
main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These
units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in
which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth
hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands
of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single
producing organization under unified control and management.
A. BELE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2 (1st ed. 1932)
[hereinafter cited is BERLE & MEANS].
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Four years later the Supreme Court dealt with the issue in
Wilson v. United States.27 A subpoena was issued to a corporation
of which Wilson was the president for the production of corporate
books containing letters and telegrams signed by Wilson and
allegedly relating to criminal violations on his part. The accused
challenged the validity of the subpoena and asserted the right of
an officer of a corporation to refuse to produce documents that
tended to incriminate him. The Court reiterated its holding in
Hale v. Henkel that corporations themselves do not have a fifth
amendment privilege, but went on to decide that an officer of a
corporation is protected by the fifth amendment only as it pertains to the production of his private books and papers. The privilege, the Court held, did not attach to books of the corporation
in his possession, which by virtue of their character are held
subject to the examination of the state.
The dissenting opinion referred back to the English common
law, pointing out that the privilege applied when the possessor of
the documents would be incriminated if forced to produce them. 8
It therefore followed, according to the dissent, that the privilege
should apply to Wilson as he was under indictment for two related offenses and would be personally incriminated. Justice
McKenna, citing Dean Wigmore in support of his argument,
2
noted that: 1
[w]here the corporate misconduct involves also the claimant's
misconduct, or where the document is in reality the personal act
of the claimant though nominally that of the corporation, its
disclosures are virtually his own and to that extent his privilege
protects him from producing them.
The Wilson Court did not have to invoke the visitorial power
of the state over corporations to uphold the subpoena for the
papers involved there. The decision in Boyd had explicitly stated
that the privilege was a personal one, and this protected only
private papers. Whereas the Boyd Court could assume that the
papers of a family partnership were private papers, no such inference could be drawn in the Wilson case. Wilson was but one
member of the Board of Directors of a large corporation." There
27. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
28. Id. at 387 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 390 (dissenting opinion), quoting WIGMORE ON EVMEN E § 2259 (1st ed.
1904).
30. Wilson was the president of the United Wireless Telegraph Company, which had
issued $10,000,000 of common stock and $10,000,000 of preferred and participating stock.
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did not exist as intimate a relationship between Wilson and the
corporation as existed in the Boyd family partnership. The Court
could have simply based its holding on the absence of a close
personal identification between Wilson and the corporation. As a
result of not employing this simpler Boyd analysis, the decision
in Wilson had the effect of promulgating an inflexible rule which
would act to deny corporate officers the privilege against selfincrimination under all circumstances, and would impose as well
acceptance of visitation by the government as a cost of incorporating.
Two years after Wilson the Court decided Grant v. United
States,31 a case which highlights the shortcomings of the Wilson
analysis. Documents were subpoenaed from Grant, the attorney
for a corporation which had only one shareholder. Grant claimed
that since the shareholder had personal title to the corporation,
and the subpoenaed records had a far more personal application
to him than did those in the Wilson case to Wilson, the sole
shareholder should be granted the privilege. The die had been
cast, however, and the Court merely affirmed its decision in
Wilson, holding that the privilege never applies to the records of
a corporation, regardless of the circumstances. 2 Thus under the
Court's holding, a person who is distinguished from a sole proprietor only by the fact that he chose to incorporate his business, is
denied a basic constitutional right afforded to the sole proprietor.
Had the Court used the Boyd rationale and focused on the close
relationship between Grant and the corporation, it could have
found that the fifth amendment privilege applied to Grant.
Under such an analysis the determining factor would have been
that the records, though corporate in title, were in reality the
personal papers of the sole stockholder and therefore protected.
The inflexible rule arising out of Grant and Wilson was undoubtedly a result of the Court's concern with the problem of how
to effectively control the large corporations which had begun to
appear in the early part of the twentieth century. 33 The concept
of a visitorial power of government over corporations provided a
The company had stations, as well as ships, equipped with the company's apparatus on
both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This information was obtained from POOR'S MANUAL
OF INDUSTRIALS 1911, SECOND ANNUAL NUmBER.

31. 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
32. Id. at 79-80.
33. See note 26 supra. See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
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convenient vehicle for justifying the denial of the fifth amendment privilege to corporate officers. The fact that it applied to the
smallest corporations as well as the largest was but a small price
to pay for this effective method of controlling those corporations
whose steady growth made their regulation a matter of national
concern. 4 Although Wilson heralded an era of increasingly restrictive application of the fifth amendment's protection as it
applied to business documents, Boyd still retained its vitality in
relation to partnerships. 5
B.

UnincorporatedAssociations

The next major curtailment of the fifth amendment privilege
came in United States v. White,36 which involved a subpoena to
an officer of an unincorporated association-a labor union. The
officer claimed the fifth amendment privilege on behalf of the
union and for himself on the ground that the documents could
personally incriminate him. The courts were unable to use the
theory of visitorial power since that concept is logically limited
to corporations. In granting the privilege the court of appeals37
reasoned that labor unions, unlike corporations, are not creatures
of the state, and thus are not subject to the state's visitorial
power. It considered the documents to be the private property of
the union members, who, if they had wanted, could have chosen
not to keep any records at all.37-1
The Supreme Court disagreed. It reasoned that the denial of
the fifth amendment privilege to corporations in Wilson was
based on the inherent and necessary power of the federal government to enforce its laws, an interest which prevails regardless of
the type of organization involved. Thus, although the Court was
unable to apply the Wilson rationale, it found sufficient justification for denying the privilege in the public necessity for effective
34. The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant
corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of
individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one
community and prosperity to another. The organizations which they control
have passed beyond the realm of private enterprise-they have become more
nearly social institutions.
BERLE & MEANs, supra note 26, at 46.
35. United States v. Brasley, 268 F. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
36. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
37. 137 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1943).
37.1. Id. at 26.
38. 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944).
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regulation of union activities." The Court then turned to the task
of articulating a test for distinguishing between those noncorporate organizations which could invoke the fifth amendment
privilege and those which could not. It reasoned that:4"
Conclusions on this are not reached by any mechanical
comparison of unions with corporations or with other entities
nor by any determination of whether unions technically may be
regarded as legal personalities for any or all purposes. The test,
rather, is whether one can fairly say under all circumstances
that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common
or group interests only. If so, the privilege could not be invoked
on behalf of the organization or its representatives in their official capacity.
In determining whether the union of which White was an
officer represented more than the private or personal interests of
its members, the Court itemized the factors which made it appear
that it was a separate legal entity: like a corporation, the union's
existence was perpetual, and not dependent on the life of any
member; it operated under its own constitution and efigaged in a
multitude of business acts which clearly were not the private
undertakings of its members;4 and finally, numerous substantive
rights were granted to labor unions as separate functioning structures, such as the right to maintain strikes and to use a trademark.42 The Court thus concluded that White could not claim the
privilege on behalf of the labor union because of its scope and
impersonality and that further, he could not invoke the privilege
on his own behalf because the documents were official union documents held by him only in his capacity as a representative of the
union.
White was completely precluded from the constitutional protection which the fifth amendment was intended to provide because what the Court presented as two possible ways of invoking
the privilege was, in effect, only one. Since the Court held that
the organization was impersonal, it logically followed that White
could not have been holding the documents personally. He was a
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

700.
701.
701-02.
703.
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representative acting in his official capacity. Only if White had
been able to show that the records were not those of the organization, but his own private (intimate) papers would he have been
protected from their compelled production. 2 '"
The White Court attempted to strike a balance between the
need for effective law enforcement in relation to an increasingly
large sphere of business activity and the constitutional protection
of individual citizens. The test which the White Court developed,
however, is confounded by so many variables that lower courts
have had great difficulty in applying it." The Court, for example,
supplied no guidelines for determining whether an organization
is impersonal. Is impersonality to be measured by the size of the
association's operations, the number of its members or the ratio
of time given to group as opposed to personal activities" by the
possessor of the required documents? Whether an organization
embodies purely private or purely group interests was posited as
a key factor in the test. Yet most organizations, in fact, combine
private and group interest."
The Supreme Court dealt with cases involving unincorporated associations whose officers attempted to assert the fifth
amendment privilege on their own behalf four more times after
White."0 The Court failed to apply the test it had formulated in
White, and merely assumed in each of the cases that an individual acts in a representative capacity when he holds the records
of an unincorporated association. In each of the cases the Court
failed to inquire into the particular characteristics of the association, and whether it was subject to the same kind of regulation
and benefits to which the labor union involved in the White case
was subject. Thus, what the White Court deemed of critical importance-the case by case determination of whether an association was so impersonal that it could not be said to embody the
purely private or personal interests of its constituents 4 7-appears
to have been replaced by a mechanical application of case law in
42.1. Id. at 704.
43. See text accompanying notes 50, 53, 55, 56, 69 & 75 infra.
44. 322 U.S. at 705-06.
45. Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarranAct, and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 18 U. CH. L. REv. 687, 705 (1951).
46. See McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress);
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (Communist Party of Denver); United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1950) (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee). See also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (local labor union).
47. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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the area. These decisions clearly indicated that, henceforth, it
would be assumed that, like corporations," unincorporated associations did not embody the personal interests of their constituents and therefore, their officers could not invoke a personal privilege with regard to documents held in conjunction with the association.
C. Partnerships
In the case of partnerships, there did not seem to be such an
assumption. The criteria for determining specifically when the
privilege would apply to partnerships, however, had yet to be
developed, and this produced serious uncertainty in the lower
courts.49
The Supreme Court did not deal with the issue of the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to documents held by a
partnership for a long while after the Boyd case. Thus it was a
district court, in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 0 which first attempted to set some guidelines in this area. The case involved a
subpoena directed at a small family partnership of six. The government argued that partnerships should be treated like corpora48. Whether the White test applied to corporations was decided in the case of In re
Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The I.R.S. had summoned the production
of the books and records of a corporation which had only one stockholder. Respondent
argued that the test for whether the fifth amendment privilege should apply was whether
or not the corporation embodies and represents the purely personal and private interests
of the individual. As the holder of all the stock of the corporation he believed he was
entitled to claim the privilege. The court, however, refused to "question the obvious fact
that business corporations, by virtue of their creation by the state and because of the
nature and purpose of their activities, differ in many significant respects from unions,
religious bodies, trade associations, social clubs, and other types of organizations.
Id. at 179. Thus, although here there was complete identification between the individual
and the corporation, the court overlooked the White test entirely and simply fell back on
the fact of the incorporation in order to deny the privilege. But see Application of Daniels,
140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) where the prosecutor attempted to obtain the books and
records of a Panamanian corporation which had never done business in this country and
whose president, the petitioner, was the sole stockholder of the corporation. The government contended that by their nature, corporate books could never be held in a personal
capacity and that therefore, the fifth amendment could not be invoked. The court stated
that but for the extraordinary circumstances of this case, it would have followed the
Wilson precedent. The visitorial powers could not be invoked since the enterprise was not
incorporated in this country and further, the argument that effective policing and regulating of business entities requires the state to be able to inspect books and records also could
not be sustained, since the corporation was not doing business in this country. Thus, the
court would not accept as an irrebuttable presumption the premise that corporate records
are always held in an official capacity and concluded that the petitioner was holding the
books in his personal capacity, and further that he was entitled to claim the privilege.
49. See note 43 supra.
50. 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
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tions because, by their very creation, the partners lose their exclusive rights to their property and papers. Further, the government
argued, the increased economic power of a partnership made it
clearly distinguishable from the enterprise of an individual. The
court recognized the partnership's claim of privilege because the
partners' joint ownership of their papers was no less personal than
that of an individual.' The court reasoned that if the partnership
had been large and impersonal, it might have reached a different
result. In cases involving a small family partnership such as the
one before it, however, where the only purpose was to conduct the
personal business of the partners and divide and share profits and
losses for their mutual benefit, the court concluded that the
White test was not fulfilled.'
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum is important because it developed some guidelines for determining whether a particular partnership met the White test. In addition, it warned that partnerships, which since Boyd12 had been assumed to have a personal
privilege, could no longer claim such a privilege merely as a result
of being a partnership as opposed to a corporation or an unincorporated association. Partnerships too had to pass the scrutiny of
the White test.
Using the White test, lower courts have had no trouble denying the privilege to large partnerships.-3 In determining the
applicability of a claim of personal privilege, the courts have
looked to the personal identification of the partners with the business as evidenced by their everyday control over partnership deci51. Id. at 421.
51.1 Id.

52. See United States v. Brasley, 268 F. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920) which, following Boyd,
held that partnership documents were protected by the fifth amendment.

53. The test has also been applied to limited partnerships. In United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963), the court considered the applicability of the privilege

to limited partnerships. Appellant was subpoenaed to produce certain records of five
limited partnerships which shared the same office. In each of these partnerships there were

three general partners, all of whom were related to each other, and between twenty-five
and one hundred forty-seven limited partners. The business ran into millions of dollars.
The court held that the partnership in this case could not be said to represent the purely
private or personal interests necessary under the White test, despite the fact that the three
general partners were of one family. In fact the court based its decision on the similarity
between this type of organization and a corporation, comparing the limited partners to
shareholders in a small corporation and the general partners to the officers. It reasoned
that since the state grants the privilege of limited liability to limited partnerships as it
does to corporations, it is entitled to a quid pro quo, i.e., the unfettered right of inspection
of the business records.
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sions.Y In In re Mal Brothers Contracting Company,55 the Third
Circuit held that where a partnership had all the characteristics
of a corporate enterprise, the papers sought were purely business
papers, and the partners did not know anything about the accounting and bookkeeping of the business, the privilege should be
denied. The particular partnership employed approximately two
hundred people and had an annual payroll in excess of one million dollars. The court not only considered the size and financial
status of the business, but also whether the partners claiming the
privilege had a close personal contact with the records that were
being subpoenaed. As in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (and
seemingly in Boyd), the court looked to the identification the
accused had with the documents rather than the size of the organization involved.
0
The six partnerships involved in United States v. Cogan,"
were small general partnerships, each of which would dissolve
upon the death of any one of its partners. The district court, in
holding that the partnership documents were protected by the
fifth amendment, stated that: 57
Neither counsel's researches nor ours have disclosed a case
where a general partnership-with its life measured by the survival and adherence of the partners, with property, management, responsibility and fiduciary duty all organized in the traditional way-has been held to be within the principles of
United States v. White.
The court warned, however, that not every enterprise labeled a
general partnership would have the privilege: 8
[p]artnerships with scores or hundreds of members, where the
relationship is not and cannot be face-to-face, where there is an
inevitable measure of bureaucratization, of defined "office"
apart from particular incumbents, of permanence, "institutionalization," and action by designated agents in "representative
capacities" [might not be protected under the White test].
54. In re Mal Bros. Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Cogan, 257
F. Supp. 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 210
(D.D.C. 1954).
55. 444 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1971).
56. 257 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id. at 174.
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Apparently, a high degree of impersonalization' was thought to
be needed under the White test before the privilege would be
denied.
The Supreme Court dramatically limited the scope of the
privilege by enunciating a new test" in Bellis v. United States."
In Bellis, the petitioner, who was being investigated for tax fraud,
was served with a subpoena directing him to turn over all the
records of a dissolved three-person partnership of which he had
been a member. In addition to the three partners, the firm had
six other employees: two other attorneys, three secretaries and a
receptionist. Petitioner argued that in view of the modest size of
the partnership, it was unrealistic to consider the firm more than
an embodiment of the personal legal practice of the individual
partners.2 He further reasoned that because he had a direct and
substantive ownership interest in the partnership records, he did
not hold them in a representative capacity. In effect, Bellis
argued that since the partnership represented merely the private
and personal interest of its constituents, on the basis of the White
"impersonality" test his records should be protected. 3 The Court
rejected the White test, stating that it was ineffective in determining whether the privilege should apply in the broad range of
cases.64 It did, however, use the White decision in another sense,
citing it for the proposition that "individuals, when acting as
representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to their
purely personal privileges."6 Acknowledging that the distinction
between individuals acting in a representative as opposed to personal capacity is only relevant in the context of "organized institutional activity," the Court went on to formulate a test to determine what that kind of activity encompasses: 6
59. See In re Mal Bros. Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963); Unites States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190

(D.D.C. 1954). Contra, note 69 infra.
60. The court of appeals in Bellis, 483 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1973), had presaged this

further curtailment of the privilege by denying the three-person Bellis partnership the
protection of the fifth amendment on the basis of the White impersonality test. Although
this represented the minority view of the courts, there was evidently a growing confusion
as to the extent of the privilege with respect to small partnerships. It is this confusion

which may have led the Supreme Court to abandon the White test and to formulate a
test which could be more uniformly applied.
61. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 92-93.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 5

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

The group must be relatively well organized and structured, and
not merely a loose, informal association of individuals. It must
maintain a distinct set of organizational records, and recognize
rights in its members of control and access to them. And the
records subpoenaed must in fact be organizational records held
in a representative capacity.
On the basis of these formulations, the Court found that,
though small, the Bellis partnership did have an established institutional identity independent of the individual partners. It
represented a formal institutional arrangement organized for the
continuing conduct of the firm's legal practice. It had existed for
fifteen years and state partnership law imposed on the firm a
certain organizational structure. State law, it was noted, generally regards partnerships as distinct entities for numerous purposes-they may, for example, establish separate bank accounts
and file separate partnership returns for federal tax purposes.
In determining whether Bellis held the partnership records
in a representative capacity, the Court observed that the subpoenaed documents were merely the financial records of the partnership, which were held subject to the rights granted to the other
partners by state partnership law. Under state law they are partnership property and the petitioner's interest in partnership property is a derivative interest subject to significant limitations.
Therefore, as to Bellis personally, it was reasoned that he held the
records in a representative capacity and could not therefore claim
the privilege.
Thus the Court laid to rest an assumption which had persisted almost unchallenged since Boyd-that small partnerships
were private affairs, carrying with them the individual protections guaranteed by the fifth amendment. The Court did leave
open the question of how it would deal with a small family partnership or with a partnership involving some other preexisting
relationship of confidentiality among the partners." Yet if the
Court's own standards were applied, the question of whether
these types of partnerships can invoke the protection of the fifth
amendment appears to be foreclosed,"8 for the effect of its ruling
67. Id. at 101.
68. A recent Tax Court case, Harry Gordon, 63 T.C. No. 7 (Oct. 31, 1974), has applied
the Bellis standard to a two-person family partnership. The Tax Court held that the
records of a two-person family partnership were not the private records of the petitioner,
but rather the business records of an organized partnership. The court found that the
Derby Turf Club, an organized gambling establishment, possessed an even greater institu-
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is to deny the privilege to all partnerships that are subject to
typical state partnership laws. 9
The Uniform Partnership Act, which forty-one states'-1 have
adopted, makes no distinction between a small family partnership and a three-person partnership. State laws are not concerned
with the kind of partnerships involved, but whether a partnership

exists at all. Certainly, the Court's rationale as to why Bellis
could not invoke the privilege is equally applicable to the smallest

of family partnerships. Following the Court's reasoning, it would
not seem to be necessary even to have a formal partnership agree-

ment, for it is the mere fact of entering into a partnership which
tional identity than the Bellis three-person partnership despite the fact that there was one
less partner and that its two partners were members of one family.
[Tihe Court in terms leaves open the question of "a small family partnership"
. . . no fair reading of Bellis leaves much legitimate room for speculation that
the result there would have been different had there only been two partners, or
had the law firm members happened to have been father and son-in-law ...
[The decision] offers little comfort to two-men or family partnerships in general where a closely-organized business operation of institutional character is
involved.
63 T.C. No. 7, CCH 1974 TAx CT. REG. DEC. 32,823 at 3088. While Bellis left open the
applicability of the privilege to some small family partnerships, the specific criteria used
by the Court in reaching its decision seemed to foreclose such a possibility. Similarly,
the Gordon case (in which institutional identity was determined by the fact that formal
partnership returns were filed, that a partnership bank account was maintained, and that
the stationery had the name of the firm on the letterhead) implies that a partnership, no
matter how small, will not be granted the privilege. Nevertheless, both in Bellis and in
Gordon (which attempted to apply the Bellis standard) there is at least the assertion that
there may still be partnerships with a sufficiently limited institutional identity, to retain
the fifth amendment privilege. Neither court seems willing to recognize that the logical
extension of its holding is that no partnership will be able to make use of the privilege.
69. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 358 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1973) looked
to the Uniform Partnership Act to determine whether the four members of the partnership
in question could claim the fifth amendment privilege on the basis of the White test. The
court reasoned that the Act gave the partnership a separate legal identity apart from the
individual partners. Recognizing that the Uniform Partnership Act applied to all partnerships, it concluded that in the absence of partnership agreements altering its statutory
provisions, partnerships should not be treated any differently than corporations or other
impersonal associations. Thus, any records belonging to the partnership are possessed by
a partner in a purely representative capacity. The fact that the BeUis Court chose to keep
open the question of whether family partnerships would enjoy the privilege might have
led it, in its review of lower court decisions, to overlook this case even though it is clearly
supportive of the conclusion in Bellis.
69.1. The following states have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
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seems to impose the requisite independent institutional identity.
The factor of longevity which the Court also relied on to determine whether there is organized institutional activity-the Bellis
partnership had been in existence for fifteen years-is equally
applicable to the smallest of family partnerships. In addition, the
partnership law"0 that deprives Bellis of a direct ownership interest in the records, and leads the Court to conclude that he held
them in a representative capacity, affects small family partnerships in the same manner.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that Boyd should have
controlled, 71 not because it had resolved the issue that all partnership records were protected 72 but because it established the proposition that there is no constitutional distinction between a man's
private (individually held) records and private records kept in
conjunction with a partnership. 7 Justice Douglas further contended that the White test, which the Court had developed to
determine whether organizational records were personal, was still
valid and could be used effectively to prevent a further dilution
of a basic constitutional right. Using this test, Douglas pointed
out that none of the aspects of impersonal activity, which the
White Court had seized upon in denying the privilege to the officer of the labor union, were present in the Bellis partnership. The
Bellis partnership was structured so that it would have dissolved
automatically upon the death of any member and so that any
partner could have bound the entire partnership in the conduct
of its affairs. Each partner individually was a co-owner of all
property. Legal liabilities arising from property owned by the
partnership extended to the partners individually if the common
partnership assets were exhausted.7 1 In highlighting the section of
the Uniform Partnership Act which treats a partnership as an
aggregate of individuals and not as a separate entity, Justice
Douglas also cast doubt on the majority's conclusion that the
partnership had an established institutional identity independent of its members, and that Bellis held the records in a representative capacity. In essence, Justice Douglas reasoned that this
70. See Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 415-16, 203 A.2d 547, 549-50 (1964).
71. 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
72. The majority agreed that Boyd did not decide the issue presented in this case.
Id. at 95 n.2. The difference is, however, that Justice Douglas disagrees insofar as the
majority states that the Boyd Court completely disregarded the fact that these were
partnership records.
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id. at 103.
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partnership had no real existence apart from the individual attorneys and that Bellis, like Boyd, was not holding the records as a
representative of a separate impersonal entity with no rights
under the fifth amendment. On the contrary, they were his private papers, which he held in a purely personal capacity and the
privilege should have attached.
The majority in Bellis based its decision almost exclusively
on the fact that state partnership laws gave the Bellis partnership
enough structure for it to be considered an independent entity.
Because all partnerships are subject to the same type laws to
which the Bellis partnership was subject, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that partners no longer have a privilege with respect to their partnership records. The proposed resolution of
Justice Douglas would have avoided this result. The White test,
which was the Court's initial attempt at defining the parameters
of Boyd, would have continued to serve the purpose of delineating
which organizations could claim the privilege and which could
not. Although the lower courts initially struggled in trying to
apply it, they devised standards for determining whether the
privilege should apply which were consistent with the rationale
for protecting private records and documents.
United States v. Slutsky, 5 a 1972 district court case, is a
good example of how viable the test can be. The partnership
claiming the privilege there consisted of two brothers who operated a resort known as the Nevele Country Club. It had a payroll
of one million dollars and four million dollars in gross receipts.
The partners lived on the resort premises and personally managed it full-time. The two partners and their two sons were the
only persons authorized to draw checks on the partnership. The
government argued that the nature of the partnership in size,
scope and impersonality warranted treating it as a corporation.
The court, applying the White test, disagreed, citing the fact
that the partners gave their personal attention to the day-to-day
business activities of the partnership; that all four persons who
could draw checks lived on the resort premises; and that they
were familiar with the firm's accounting and bookkeeping because they had only one full-time accountant and bookkeeper.
The court concluded that, despite the size of its business, this
partnership was not in the nature of a corporate entity. It contrasted the facts of this case, in which the partners gave their full
75. 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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attention to the day-to-day business activities of the partnership,
with the facts in In re Mal Brothers Contracting Company, in
which the partners were not involved personally in either the
accounting or engineering part of the business." The court thus
quashed the subpoena because the records sought were not
"merely impassive and impersonal records of business events
transacted between the firm and those with whom it dealt."7
They were personal within the meaning of Boyd and thus fell
inside the ambit of the fifth amendment privilege.
The district court in United States v. Slutsky78 analyzed the
actual relationship that existed between the partners and the
documents to determine whether they were private records held
in a personal capacity. Such a case by case examination of the
relationship between the ownership group and the documents is
necessary to be consistent with the origins and the purpose of the
fifth amendment. In contrast, the Bellis analysis focused on state
partnership laws to determine whether there was organized institutional activity, rather than on the reality and the details of the
everyday functioning of the partnership. The issue of whether the
records were in fact private was completely obfuscated. If the
standards propounded in Bellis are followed, the death knell for
partners claiming the privilege with respect tc partnership records and documents will have been sounded.
John F. Molinari
Garry Richard Seligson
76. Id. at 1107-08.
77. Id. at 1108.
78. 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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